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INTRODUCTION
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals with com-
mercial paper.' The Negotiable Instruments Law was written in
1896 and adopted in Ohio in 1902, and consequently there has been
a long period in which to discover the defects or "bugs" in that Law.
Article 3 of the new Code is concerned with an attempted elimi-
nation of those "bugs."
In many respects the language of the Negotiable Instruments
Law has proved ambiguous. Professor Beutel, an authority on the
subject, has stated that in at least 70 sections of the Law the courts
have differed in their interpretations. Moreover, in the 50-odd years
of operation under the Negotiable Instruments Law, new commer-
cial customs have developed which render parts of the old Law
obsolete.
Thus, the chief purposes of Article 3 of the new Code are to
clarify the existing law, to settle conflicts in the interpretation of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, and to give legislative recogni-
tion to current customs.
In this paper no attempt will be made to cover every detail of
the new Code and its Comments, nor to engage in analytical dis-
cussion of the various problems, nor to attribute to the drafters of
the Code some deep-rooted philosophy or approach which in reality
did not exist. After all, they approached their task problem by prob-
lem, and I will reflect their approach in this article and will merely
call attention to a number of the more significant provisions and
endeavor to indicate briefly the purposes of the Code and, where
necessary, how it changes the present law.
*Professor of Law and Dean, School of Law, Western Reserve Univers-
ity. A.B., Dartmouth, 1916; LL.B., Western Reserve, 1925; J.S.D., Yale, 1941.
1 Among periodical literature pertaining to Article 3 are the following:
Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3, and the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NE_. L. REv. 531 (1951) (disapproving
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3); Cosway, Innova-
tions in Articles Three and Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CONTNsp. PRoB. 284 (1951); Emblidge, Commercial Paper Under the Pro-
posed Uniform Code, 23 N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N BuLz. 371 (1951); Leary,
Some Clarifications in the Law of Commercial Paper Under the Proposed
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 U. OF PA. L. Rlv. 354 (1949); Palmer, Ne-
gotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48 MicH. L. Rrv.
255 (1950); Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper,
[1952] Wis. L. REv. 230.
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Although Ohio cases will be cited, I will not encumber the
article by too many citations. In the absence of citation, it may
be assumed that there is no serious obstacle, decision-wise, to the
adoption of the specific code section.
For the sake of brevity I will use the abbreviations NIL and
UCC for the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, respectively.
An important feature of the UCC, which runs through the
whole Code, is Section 1-102 (3) (f), providing that the Comments
may be consulted in the construction and application of the Code.
From that source is derived a mine of material disclosing the in-
tention of the codifiers. If the Code is adopted, some means must
be founa for making the Comments available to lawyers and judges.
PART I.
SHORT TITLE, Fomw AND INTERpnETATiON.
Section 3-102 (1) (c) clarifies a somewhat troublesome situa-
tion. It provides: "A 'promise' is an undertaking to pay and must
be more than an acknowledgement of an obligation." Under Sec-
tion 1 (2) of the NIL,2 an instrument, to be negotiable, must con-
tain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money. Con-
fusion has arisen in the case of instruments acknowledging debts
but not containing words promising to pay. Other variations of
language have likewise caused difficulty. For example, in Shemonia
v Verda3 the instrument read, in substance: "I borrow money from
[plaintiff], the sum of $500 with 4% interest. The borrowed money
ought to be paid within four months from the above date." Al-
though the issue was whether the paper constituted an instrument
for the unconditional payment of money, within the statute author-
izing a short form of pleading,4 the court 'went beyond the bare
necessities of the case and held that the instrument was a promis-
sory note. However, the court added that Section 11334 of the Ohio
General Code comprehends instruments which do not contain all
the elements of a promissory note.
The Comment to the UCC subsection cited above recites the
exact wording of the instrument in the Shemoni case and states
that the subsection is intended to change the holding therein so
far as the promissory note element is concerned. In view of the
infrequency of such strange instruments, and the more logical ap-
proach of the UCC, the change is completely justified. The sub-
section also makes it clear that an "I.O.U.," containing no promis-
sory language, is not a promissory note. The same is true of an
instrument reading, "Due John Smith $100."
2 Rio G~m. ConE Sec. 8106 (2).
3 24 Ohio App. 246, 157 N.E. 717 (1927).
4 OHEO GN. CoDz Sec. 11334.
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Section 3-103 (1) represents one of the most significant develop-
ments in the UCC. By Section 1 of the NIL,5 an instrument, to be
negotiable, must conform to certain requirements, including, for
example, the requirement that it be payable in money. But in the
years since 1896, when the NIL was written, the business world
has created new instruments, treated by businessmen as negotiable,
yet sometimes lacking some element required by the NIL. An ex-
ample is the interim certificate, in which the promise is not to
pay in money but is to deliver definitive bonds. Faced with the lan-
guage of the NIL, courts have held that such nonconforming in-
struments are not negotiable. Thus, the law is at odds with business
custom and prevents the development of new categories of negoti-
able instruments.
The UCC cures the evil by the subsection referred to, which
states that Article 3 "does not apply to ... investment securities."
Such instruments are covered in Article 8, which recognizes the
needs of business in this respect.
It is interesting to observe that an Ohio court has reached the
desirable result in an interim certificate case- partly by holding
that the NIL is not intended to cover interim certificates and that
the law merchant must be left free to develop new instruments,
unhampered by the NIL. 6
Subsection (2) subjects Article 3 to the provisions of Article
4, entitled "Bank Deposits and Collections," and Article 9, dealing
with secured transactions, including chattel paper. Other papers
in this series will deal with Articles 4 and 9; consequently, they
will not be discussed here.7
Section 3-104 (2) defines the instruments included in Article
3. These consist of drafts, checks, certificates of deposit, and notes.
The subsection brings into one place, definitions which are widely
scattered in the NIL. It should be noted that the UCC prefers the
word "draft" to the term "bill of exchange."
Section 3-105 is both important and comprehensive. It arises
from difficulties in connection with NIL Section 3,8 stating that
an order or promise is unconditional, though coupled with certain
things, including indication of a particular fund or account and a
statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument. The
NIL then states that an order or promise to pay out of a particular
5 Owo Gnt. CoDE Sec. 8106.6 Hopple v. Cleveland Discount Co., 25 Ohio App. 138, 157 N. 414
(1927).
7 See Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper,
[1952] Wis L Rv. 230, 235, for a discussion of the "consumer goods" pro-
visions of Article 9. These provisions relate to the position of the purchaser
of "chattel paper."8 Omio GEw. CoDE Sec. 8108.
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fund is not unconditional. It is obvious that the NIL is rather gen-
eral and leaves some situations in the air.
Without enumerating all the problems solved by this section
of the UCC, I will mention some important ones and show how
the UCC handles them.
1. The instrument contains a recital of the consideration for
which it was issued. The recital shows that the consideration is
executory. Although the majority rule upholds negotiability, some
courts hold that payment is conditioned upon performance by the
payee and therefore the promise to pay is conditional.9 This view
overlooks the fact that the NIL attempts to distinguish between
express and implied conditions. The latter are no part of the in-
strument; therefore the promise is unconditional and a holder in
due course may recover despite the failure of the payee to perform.
Two Ohio cases, decided in the same appellate district fifteen
years apart, take opposite views on the problem. 10 However, in the
earlier case a payee is suing, and perhaps this may serve as a dis-
tinguishing factor, although the contrary conclusions of the two
courts are based upon opposite viewpoints toward the problem at
hand. Subsections (1) (a) and (1) (b) of Section 3-105 of the UCC
provide that a promise or order otherwise unconditional is not
made conditional by the recital in question, thus being in accord
with the more recent of the Ohio decisions.
2. A conflict of authority has arisen in connection with instru-
ments reciting that they are made "in accordance with" or "as per"
a contract of even date, etc." Section 3-105 (1) (b) upholds their
negotiability. This represents the more realistic view, and there
is nothing to indicate that Ohio is contra at the present time.
3. A similar problem arises with the trade acceptance which
recites: "The obligation of the acceptor arises out of the purchase
of goods from the drawer, maturity being in conformity with the
original terms of purchase." The majority rule is that the last
clause renders the promise conditional- again an unrealistic
9 BaiTTON, BrLs ANm NorFs Sec. 16 (1943). This book will be cited as
BnnrrOM, followed by the section or page and omitting the date of publica-
tion.
10 Haley v. King, 3 Ohio App. 323, 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 364, 26 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 259 (1914) (holding that the instrument was not a promissory
note); Cincinnati Brush & Mop Mfg. Co. v. Weber, 35 Ohio App. 506, 172
N.E. 568 (1929) (negotiable note). The opinion in the second case makes
no reference to the first.
IIBRInTON 52. Professor Britton states the correct rule that the "as per"
recital does not render the promise conditional, but there are cases contra,
e.g., Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Times Publishing Co., 142 La. 209, 76
So. 612 (1917). See Notes, 14 A.L.R. 1126 (1921); 33 A.L.R 1173 (1924); 37
A.L.R. 655 (1925); 61 A.L.R. 815 (1929); 104 A.L.R. 1378 (1936).
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view.12 In Subsections (1) (b) and (1) (c) the UCC adopts the
minority rule. Ohio has reached the result of the minority rule on
the ground that although the words incorporate the trade accept-
ance, the incorporation relates to maturity only and does not affect
the absolute promise to pay.13
4. The instrument states that it is for the sale of certain per-
sonal property and that title to the property shall remain in the
seller until the instrument has been paid. It is difficult to see how
such a recital renders the promise to pay conditional, but some
courts so hold.14 Subsection (1) (e) adopts the correct rule that
the recital does not make the promise conditional.
5. In accordance with the NIL, the UCC, in Subsections (2) (a)
and (b) of Section 3-105, makes the promise conditional if it is sub-
ject to or governed by another agreement or, generally, if it is to
be paid only out of a particular fund. However, under Subsection
(1) (g), if the instrument is issued by a government or govern-
mental agency or unit, payment may be limited to a particular
fund. This accords with the practicalities of the situation.
Section 3-106 deals with sum certain. NIL Sections 1 and 215
contain the corresponding provisions under present law. The UCC
adds a new provision, Subsection (1) (c), providing that the sum
is certain even though it is to be paid with a stated discount if paid
before the date fixed for payment. The NIL is silent on the point,
and the majority view seems to be against negotiability. 16 Ohio has
not passed upon the point.
Section 3-107, defining "money," performs a useful service by
stating rules applicable to instruments drawn payable in a foreign
currency. To put the matter mildly, the cases are confusing' 7 and
clarification is sorely needed.
Section 3-109 contains provisions of importance.
In the first place, in conjunction with Section 3-104 (1) (c), it
excludes instruments payable at a "determinable future time."
Such instruments are recognized by NIL Sections 1 (3) and 4 (3) ,8
and include those made payable at or after the death of a named
person. In reality there is no certain time, of payment for this sort
of instrument, because it is payable at or after the happening of an
12 E.g, Westlake Mercantile Finance Corp. v. Merritt, 204 Cal. 673, 269
Pac. 620 (1928). Contra: Heller v. Cuddy, 172 Minn. 126, 214 N.W. 924 (1927).
13 State Trade Corp. v. Tobias Studio, 64 Ohio App. 516, 29 NE. 2d 38
(1940).
* 
14 BPaToN See. 14.
IS OHIo GEN. CoDE Secs. 8106, 8107.
16 E.g., Waterhouse v. Chouinard, 128 Me. 505, 149 AtL 21 (1930). It
must be admitted that such a note is mathematically uncertain as to sum.
17 BmrroN 126.
18 OHro GEN. CoDE Secs. 8106 (3), 8109 (3)
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event the time of the happening of which is uncertain, even though
the event itself is certain to occur. Inquiry among bankers has
elicited the fact that the commercial world does not regard such
a note as negotiable, and the UCC thus rids us of a useless append-
age.
A second important change involves acceleration clauses. NIL
Section 4 (2) 19 is too indefinite, and, in general, courts have follow-
ed their own common law. The majority rule is that if the holder
has an uncontrolled option to accelerate the due date, the instru-
ment is uncertain as to time and, therefore, not negotiable.20 This
rule overlooks the actualities of the situation, for such an acceler-
ation clause makes the instrument more negotiable in fact. The
UCC change is beneficial.
The NIL gives no help in determining the effect of an exten-
sion clause on negotiability. Section 3-109 (1) (d) fills the gap ef-
fectively.
Section 3-110, explaining when an instrument is and is not
payable to order, clarifies and, to some extent, changes existing
law. Section 8 is the corresponding part of the NIL.
21
In Subsection (1) the UCC section makes an instrument pay-
able to the assigns of a specified person negotiable, assuming, of
course, that it complies in all other respects.
In Subsection (1) (e) it includes within the order instrument
category, instruments payable to an estate, trust, or fund. There
are decisions under the NIL holding that such instruments are
bearer paper because the name of the payee does not purport to be
the name of any person.22 This overlooks the intent of the maker.
Under Section 8 (6) of the NIL, dealing with instruments pay-
able to the holder of an office for the time being, there has been
some difficulty.2 3 Section 3-110 (1) (f) of the UCC straightens out
the trouble by providing that an instrument payable to an office
or officer as such is payable to the order of the incumbent of the
office or his successors.
Subsection (1) (g) provides for instruments payable to the
order of a partnership or unincorporated association, and states
that such an instrument may be indorsed or transferred by any
person thereto authorized. The provision frees us from the concept
that the payee must be a legal entity and that otherwise the paper
is bearer rather than order. The NIL is silent on the point.
Subsection (2) provides that such words as "payable upon
19 Oaxo Gu. CODE Sec. 8109 (2).
2
oBm=roN Sec. 28.
21 Omo GEN. CODE Sec. 8113.
22 E.g., Hansen v. Northwestern National Bank, 175 Minn. 453, 221 N.W.
873 (1928).
2 3B'rom Sec. 46.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
return of this instrument properly indorsed" do not of themselves
make the instrument payable to order, and such an instrument is
thus nonnegotiable. This differs from the majority rule under the
NTL24 and from the pronouncement of an Ohio court.25 Most, if
not all of the cases concern certificates of deposit. The UCC pro-
vision is based upon the logical assumption that by omitting the
word "order" in the certificate, the bank intends to make the
certificate nonnegotiable. This position is strengthened by a sur-
vey made some years ago which revealed that practically all banks
included "to the order of" in their certificates of deposit.26
Section 3-112, enumerating terms and omissions not affecting
negotiability, contains an important provision in Subsection (1) (c),
which states that the negotiability of an instrument is not affected
by a promise to give additional collateral on demand. Section 5
of the NIL27 provides that an instrument which contains an order
or promise to do any act in addition to the payment of money is
not negotiable. Literally, that would include a promise to give
additional collateral, and many courts have so held. 28 But such a
decision fails to recognize the purpose of the section, which was
never intended to take away negotiability because of a promise
to bolster the security. The UCC change is a distinct improvement.
Section 3-115 (2), d e a 1 i n g with incomplete instruments,
changes the law for the better in one important respect. The sub-
section must be considered with Sections 3-305 and 3-407. Section
15 of the NIL29 states that where an incomplete instrument has
not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated without
authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder as against
any person whose signature was placed thereon before delivery.
This means that even a holder in due course loses, which seems
unfair. Should not the loss fall upon the person who made the
fraud possible by signing blank paper? Some courts place the loss
upon the maker if he has been negligent, thus making an excep-
tion to the strict terms of the statute.30 The UCC sections referred
to place the holder in due course in the preferred position and allow
him to recover.
Section 3-119 is new and attempts to set forth the rules re-
lating to a negotiable instrument issued contemporaneously with
another document, such as a mortgage.- The problem has caused
24 BRiwoN 37.
2S Felton v. Commercial National Bank, 39 Ohio App. 24, 177 N.E. 52
(1930).
26 20 CoL. L. REv. 621 (1920).
27 Oio GEu. CoDE Sec. 8110.
28 BarroN Sec. 36.
29 Omo GEN. CoDE Sec. 8120.
30 BRrTon Sec. 88.
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difficulty among the courts. The UCC makes it clear that the sepa-
rate agreement does not affect negotiability, unless, as we noted
in discussing Section 3-105, words in the instrument expressly
incorporate the separate agreement. The present section also ex-
plains the effect upon a holder of the two instruments of limita-
tions in the separate agreement.
Section 3-121, relating to instruments payable at a bank, is
mentioned here because it provides alternatives, depending upon
local commercial and banking practice. The note is made payable
at a particular bank and the question is whether or not it is to be
regarded as the equivalent of a draft drawn on the bank payable
out of funds of the maker in account with the bank. The alter-
native is that the note is not an order to the bank to pay it. Before
recommencling an alternative, the proponents of the UCC in Ohio
should be informed of the Ohio practice. The New York practice
treats it as a draft.
PART II.
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION.
As its title implies, this part deals with the transfer of negoti-
able instruments and includes the several kinds of indorsement.
Certain features deserve comment.
The first appears in Section 3-201 (1) and affects a transferee
from a holder in due course. Section 58 of the NIL31 puts a holder
who derives his title through a holder in due course in the shoes
of the latter provided the transferee is not himself a party to any
fraud or illegality affecting the instrument. This leaves open the
case of a person who is not a party to any fraud but who as a prior
holder had notice of a defense, transferred the instrument to a
holder in due course, and reacquired it. The section prohibits him
from improving his prior position by this dodge.
Section 3-202(4) contains an important provision not found
in the NIL. Examples will indicate the problems.
1. John Smith is the payee. He transfers the note to Henry
Jones, writing on the back of it, above his signature, the words,
"I assign all my right, title and interest in the within note
to Henry Jones."
Is this an indorsement or an assignment? Practically every
state now holds that it is an indorsement8 2 Smith is using the words
to transfer whatever he can, and it is foolish to say that he is trying
to give less than the law allows and to prevent Jones from becom-
ing a holder in due course. Nevertheless, a Court of Appeals in
Ohio has held it a mere assignment. 33 And a United States District
31 OHIo GEx. CODE Sec. 8163.
3 2 BPRN Sec. 58.
3 3 Carius v. Ohio Contract Purchase Co., 30 Ohio App. 57, 164 N.E. 234
(1928).
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Court has recognized that case as the law in Ohio.34 The UCC will
overthrow the case and place Ohio in the proper column. The sub-
section states that words of assignment accompanying an indorse-
ment do not affect its character as an indorsement.
2. Smith writes above his signature' the words "I guarantee
payment." Although many courts hold that this is an indorsement
so far as negotiating the instrument is concerned, there are de-
cisions contra.35 The subsection of the UCC includes these words
along with the words of assignment. Consequently the transfer to
Jones is a negotiation and makes him a holder. The effect of the
words on Smith's liability is covered in Section 3-416.
Section 3-204. Special Indorsement; Blank Indorsement. An-
other problem, which by reason of the paucity of cases combined
with its intriguing nature has caused more concern to the teachers
and writers than to the courts, is solved by the above section,
which, in part at least changes the law. As a result of the section,
a bearer instrument or an order instrument indorsed in blank is
negotiable by delivery, as at present, but only until someone in-
dorses it specifically, after which it may not be further negotiated
without indorsement. The various sections of the NIL here in-
volved will be found in the UCC Comments. The one clearly re-
pealed is section 40.36 The change is an improvement.
Section 3-206. Indorsement "For Collection," "For Deposit,"
to Agent or in Trust. This section dispenses with the term "re-
strictive indorsement," found in NIL Sections 36 and 37.37 As em-
ployed in the NIL, the term is used too broadly, as a result of
which confusion and injustice have arisen. For example, the sec-
tions practically compel a holding that neither a restrictive indorsee
nor his transferree may become a holder in due course even if he
gives value. Moreover, they are so worded as to bring about this
result even in the case of a trustee who buys the instrument for
value.
PART IlI.
RGHiTs OF A HOLDER.
Section 3-302 sets forth certain requirements necessary to con-
stitute one a holder in due course and specifies certain instances
where one does not become a holder in due course.
In requiring good faith, Subsection (1) (b) includes observance
of the reasonable commercial standards of any business in which
34 United States v. Hill, 57 F. Supp. 934 (ND. Ohio 1944).
3 SBn0rox Sec. 59.36 0Hio Gm. CODE Sec. 8145.
37 Oiro GE. CODE Secs. 8141, 8142.
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the holder may be engaged.38 A businessman should not receive the
benefit of the holder in due course status unless his actions meet
such standards.
Subsection (1) (c) remedies a defect in Section 52 (2) of the
NIL,39 requiring the holder to take the instrument before it is over-
due, in order to become a holder in due course. As usually con-
strued, the NIL prevents a completely innocent holder of an in-
stalment note from becoming a holder in due course after a de-
fault in one or more instalments.40 It is true that the overdue
feature is often intermingled with the question of notice of dis-
honor, but together they bring about the undesirable result even
though the purchaser does not know of the dishonor or nonpay-
ment. An Ohio Court of Appeals case so holds.41 The UCC changes
the result by making notice that the instalment is overdue the
test. So far as dishonor is concerned, notice is required in both
codes. This section must be read with Section 3-304(4) (a).
Subsection (2) permits a payee to be a holder in due course.
Largely by reason of the word "negotiated" in NIL S e c t i o n
52 (4),42 some courts have held that the payee may never be a
holder in due course. This is contrary to the majority view at com-
mon law.43 A federal court in Ohio has said that the exact point
has not been settled in Ohio.44
Section 3-303. Taking for Value. Subsection (a) solves an ap-
parent conflict between NIL Sections 25 and 54.4 5 Section 25 states
that value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple con-
tract. Is crediting an account value? There are cases both ways.4 6
But Section 54 states that where the transferee receives notice of
an infirmity or defect before he has paid the full amount agreed to
be paid, he will be deemed a holder in due course only to the ex-
tent of the amount theretofore paid by him. This indicates that
mere crediting is not enough. The UCC takes the latter position,
specifying that a holder takes the instrument for value to the ex-
tent that the agreed consideration has been performed.
Section 3-303 (c) solves another puzzle by providing that a
holder takes an instrument for value when he gives a negotiable
instrument for it.
38 The UCC Comment to Section 3-302 states that the "reasonable com-
mercial standards" language makes explicit what has long been implicit in
case-law handling of the good faith concept.
39 Omo Gma. CODE Sec. 8157.
40 Bpo=o 455.41 Harvard Mortgage Co. v. Neeson, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 577 (1928).
42 OHio GEN. CODE See. 8157 (4).
43 BrrToN Sec. 122.
44 United States v. Hill, 57 F. Supp. 934 (ND. Ohio 1944).
4 5 OHro GEN. CoDE Secs. 8130, 8159.
4 6 Barm= Sec. 97.
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Section 3-304. Notice to Purchaser, This is one of the most
important sections in the UCC. Sections 52, 55, and 56 of the
NIL,4  dealing with good faith and notice, do not attempt to spell
out what is and what is not notice. The UCC, on the other hand,
specifically covers a number of rather common situations, many
of which have led to uncertainty and conflict in the present law.
Some of these will now be mentioned.
Subsection (1) (a) refers, among other things, to incomplete
instruments. NIL Section 52 (1)48 requires that a person, in order
to be a holder in due course, must take an instrument complete on
its face. Inasmuch as a person who is not a holder in due course
is subject to defenses under NIL Section 58,4 9 one who purchases
an incomplete instrument finds himself in an unenviable position,
no matter how innocent he may be and even though, pursuant to
NIL Section 14,50 he fills up the instrument in accordance with the
actual authority given by the maker to the payee.51 The same result
is reached where he takes a complete instrument but knows that
it was originally incomplete when issued.52
Sections 3-304(1) (a) and (5) (d) are evidently intended to
change the rule. The latter subsection provides that the purchaser
is not given notice of a defense or claim by reason of his knowledge
that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless he has
knowledge of an improper completion. The Comment says, "It is
intended to mean that the holder may take in due course even
though a blank is filled in his presence, if he is without notice that
the filling is improper."
Subsection (2) (b) provides that the purchaser has notice of a
claim against the instrument when he has reasonable grounds to
believe that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment
of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own
benefit or otherwise in breach of duty. The counterpart is Sub-
section (5) (e), stating that knowledge that any person negotiating
the instrument is a fiduciary does not of itself give the purchaser
notice of a defense or claim. Conflicts in the common law rules have
been resolved by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, adopted in Ohio
in 1943. 53 The UCC is consistent with that Act in this respect. Con-
sequently, there will be no change in Ohio law.
Subsection 4 (a) is so important that I will mention it again
47 OHIO GEw. CODE Sees. 8157, 8160, 8161.
48 OHo GEN. CODE See. 8157 (1).
49 OHo Ga. CODE Sec. 8163.50 0mo GEN. CODE Sec. 8119.
51 But cf. First Discount Corp. v. Hatcher Auto Sales, Inc., 156 Ohio St.
191, 102 NE. 2d 4 (1951).
s2 BParnxo 471.
53 OHIo GEN. CODE Sees. 8509-7--8509-19, sub nom. Uniform Fiduciary
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even though I discussed it in part under Section 3-302(1) (c),
which complements it. Those sections result in a holder in due
course status for the purchaser of a note payable in instalments
unless he has reasonable grounds to believe that any part of the
principal is overdue or that there is an uncured default in pay-
ment of another instrument of the same series.
Subsection 4(b) resolves properly another difficult problem.
It refers to acceleration and deals with the following situation. A
note containing an acceleration clause is actually accelerated and
thereby becomes due. It is then negotiated to Smith, who knows
nothing of the acceleration. Since technically he takes after matur-
ity, he is not a holder in due course under NIL 52.5 He should be a
holder in due course and he attains that status under the present
subsection and Section 3-302 (1) (c), which make the test reasonable
grounds to believe that acceleration has been made.
Subsection (4) (c) helps to clarify the law in an important
respect. Section 53 of the NIL5 provides that where an instrument
payable on demand is negotiated an unreasonable length of time
after its issue, the holder is not deemed a holder in due course.
With reference to checks, the UCC gives us a yardstick by creating
a thirty-day presumption of reasonable time.
Subsection (5) (b) settles two points upon which the decisions
are in conflict. First it provides that knowledge that the instrument
was issued or negotiated in return for an executory promise does
not of itself give notice of a defense or claim. 6 Secondly, it pro-
vides that mere knowledge that the instrument was accompanied
by a separate agreement does not of itself give the purchaser notice
of a defense or claim, and thus he takes in good faith unless other-
wise he has notice that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms
thereof. This is obviously the just rule. T
Finally, Subsection (5) (f) settles another conflict by providing
that knowledge of a default in the payment of interest does not
constitute notice of a defense or claim.5
Section 3-305 (2) frees the holder in due course from certain
defenses. However, in Subsection (c) it recognizes fraud in the
factum as a real defense unless the signer had a reasonable oppor-
tunity to obtain knowledge of the character of the instrument or its
essential terms. Fraud in the factum relates to fraud whereby the
signer thinks he is signing some other kind of document. Even un-
54 Oo Gnx. CODS Sec. 8157. Cf. Union Central Bank v. Hall, 14 Ohio L.
Abs. 420 (Ct. of App. 1933).
ss Omo Gza. CODE Sec. 8158.
56See BuTrox Sec. 108; accord, Motor Finance Corp. v. Huntsberger,
116 Ohio St. 317, 156 N.E. 111 (1927).
57But see supra note 7 about chattel paper.
58See BsRTON Sec. 110.
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der the NIL, most courts hold fraud in the factum a real defense
and thus not cut off in the hands of a holder in due course in the
absence of negligence on the part of the maker.59
Section 3-306 (a) provides that unless he has the rights of a
holder in due course any person takes the instrument subject to
all valid claims to it on the part of any person. Some courts have
held that an innocent holder for value who takes after maturity
and therefore is not a holder in due course will be preferred as
against a person having an equitable right to the instrument.60 The
theory is that this does not concern liability on the instrument but
rather ownership of the instrument or its proceeds, for which
reason the NIL is inapplicable. Other courts hold contra.61 The
position of the UCC is with the latter, and Ohio is in accord.62
Section 3-307 (3) settles a point not clear under NIL Section
59.63 Although, of course, a holder, whether in due course or not,
may recover where there are no defenses, if there is a defense he
has the burden of proof as to the elements necessary to constitute
him a holder in due course.64 The UCC uses the term "burden of
establishing," which is defined in Section 1-201(8). There are
several Ohio cases in agreement with the UCC,65 although the Ohio
law was different before the NIL.66
PART IV.
LIABILITY OF PARTIES.
Considerable improvement, simplification, and clarification
have been effected in Part IV.
Section 3-403(2). Signature by Authorized Representative.
This section, combined with Section 1-201 (35), defining "repre-
sentative" makes it clear that officers of unincorporated essocia-
tions, trustees, executors, administrators, and the like, may sign
in a representative capacity despite the fact that the thing they
represent is not technically a legal entity.
The section also prohibits parol evidence to show whether or
not the person signed in a representative capacity. It provides that
an authorized person who signs his own name to an instrument is
59 Gross v. Ohio Savings & Trust Co., 116 Ohio St. 230, 156 N.E. 205
(1927); BaRox Sec. 130.
60 E.g., Justice v. Stonecipher, 267 IM. 448, 108 N.E. 722 (1915).
61 BmnrToN Sec. 156.
62 Osborn v. McClelland, 43 Ohio St. 284, 1 N.E. 644 (1885) (before the
NIL); Uhl v. First Nat. Bank, 120 Ohio St. 356, 166 N.E. 213 (1929).
63 OHIo GEN. CODE Sec. 8164.
64 See BarrroN Sec. 104 as to the situation under the NIL.
65SE.g., Kuchenbacher v. Gill, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 535, 33 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 192 (1911).
6 6 Davis v. Bartlett, 12 Ohio St. 534 (1861).
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personally obligated unless the instrument names the person rep-
resented and shows that the signature is made in a representative
capacity. And it adds that the name of an organization preceded
or followed by the name and office of an authorized individual is
a signature made in a representative capacity, thus settling the
troublesome problem arising from an instrument signed, "The
Smith Company, John Smith, President."
Under this section parol evidence is not admissible between
the original parties to show that an instrument signed, "John Doe,
Agent," and not containing the name of any principal, was not in-
tended to bind John Doe individually. The corresponding section
in the NIL is 20.67 There is nothing in the Ohio law at odds with
the proposed section.
Of course in this, as in other questions of parol evidence, the
UCC is not intended to affect the admissibility of parol evidence
in an action to reform the instrument.
Section 3-404. Unauthorized Signatures. Subsection 2 settles
in the affirmative the question as to whether or not a forged signa-
ture may be ratified. Ohio has held that it may not, but has recog-
nized that a person may be estopped to deny the validity of his
signature.68 The proposed change is only a step beyond the present
law, and there seems to be no reason for opposing it.
Section 3405. Impostors: Signature in Name of Payee. This
section replaces Section 9 (3) of the NIL 9 and includes both the
so-called "fictitious payee" and "impostor payee" cases. The term
"fictitious or nonexisting person," which appears in the NIL, is
dropped as being misleading, and the paper is no longer designated
as "bearer" paper, which, in truth, it is not, inasmuch as it is made
out to a named payee.
The impostor payee situation is covered in Section 3-405 (1) (a).
Speaking generally there are two main types of impostor cases.
The first is where the impostor, in a face-to-face meeting with the
victim, induces the latter to issue the instrument, designating as
payee the name falsely used by the impostor. The second is where
the impostor makes use of the mails or some other form of com-
munication. In either case, an indorsement by the impostor or his
confederate in the name of the designated payee will be effective.
The section properly rejects decisions distinguishing between the
face-to-face and the mail transactions. 70
The "fictitious payee" situation is covered by Subsections 1 (b)
and 1 (c). A typical case included in the first of these subsections
6 7 Oio Gsa. CODE Sec. 8125.
6 8 Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St 405 (1878); Shinew v. First Nat.
Bank, 84 Ohio St. 297, 95 NX. 881 (1911).
69 Oao Gm. CODE Sec. 8114 (3).
70See BnrrroN Sec 151.
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is the following. Smith, a corporate officer authorized to sign
checks, makes out a company check payable to the order of Jones.
The company is not indebted to Jones, and Smith, the villain in the
piece, indorses the name of Jones and subsequently indorses his
own name and gets the check cashed. Under the UCC provision, as
well as under NIL 9(3), the indorsement is effective and passes
title.
The second subsection changes the NIL for the better. If, in
the above example, Smith was not the agent who signed checks
but merely supplied the information to an innocent officer who
signed, the NIL would relieve the company from liability, regarding
the indorsement as a forgery. This results from the requirement
in the NIL section that the "fact" (i.e. the fictitious name) must be
known to the person making the instrument so payable. The NIL
thus distinguishes between the two situations referred to above.
Such a distinction is without merit.
Section 3-406. Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Un-
authorized Signature. This is a new section although case law has
dealt with the problems involved, - sometimes unsatisfactorily.
In essence the section precludes a person who, by his negli-
gence, substantially contributes to a material alternation of the in-
strument or to the making of an unauthorized signature, from tak-
ing advantage of the alteration or lack of authority against a
holder in due course or against a drawee or other payor who pays
the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable
commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business.
A stock example of contributing to a material alteration arises
where the drawer of a check negligently leaves spaces in the lines
pertaining to the amount, thereby facilitating alteration by a
swindler. Although in general the cases throw the loss on the negli-
gent drawer as against the drawee bank, there is a conflict among
the decisions in a suit by the holder in due course against the
drawer.7- The UCC settles the conflict in an equitable manner by
imposing liability on the drawer.
An example of negligence contributing to the making of an
unauthorized signature is found in the case of a person who has
a signature stamp for signing checks, and is negligent in looking
after it with the result that the wrongdoer obtains it and uses it
on a check. Another example is the negligent mailing of an in-
strument to a person having the same name as the payee.72
7 1 B~rroi Sec. 282. Ohio has allowed recovery by the holder in due
course against the drawer. Second Nat. Bank v. Campbell, 4 Ohio App. 158,
21 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 305, 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. 270, motion to certify over-
ruled, 60 Week. L Bull. 40 (1915).
72The S. Weisberger Co. v. Barberton Savings Bank, 84 Ohio St. 21, 95
NX. 379 (1911).
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Section 3-407. Alteration. Although this is a rather complicated
section, it does not effect any substantial change except in two re-
spects. In conjunction with Section 3-115, as stated in my discussion
thereof, the present section permits recovery by a holder in due
course of an incomplete instrument undelivered. The other princi-
pal change may perhaps be better described as a removal of un-
certainty. Whereas NIL Section 124,73 interpreted literally, avoids
a materially altered instrument as against a non-assenting party
unless it is in the hands of a holder in due course, the UCC limits
the discharge to an alteration by the holder which is both fraud-
ulent and material. Consequently, neither a non-fraudulent alter-
ation nor an alteration by a stranger will avoid the instrument.
This is in conformity with Ohio authorities."4
Section 3-408. Consideration. The most important feature of
this section is found in the provision that no consideration is neces-
sary for an instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of
or as security for an antecedent obligation of any kind. As stated
in the Comment on the section: "The provision is intended to
change the result of decisions holding that where no extension of
time or other concession is given by the creditor the new obliga-
tion fails for lack of legal consideration. It is intended also to mean
that an instrument given for more or less than the amount of a
liquidated obligation does not fail by reason of the common law
rule that an obligation for a lesser liquidated amount cannot be
consideration for the surrender of a greater."
Section 3-410. Definition and Operation of Acceptance. Obso-
lete forms of acceptance, recognized in the NIL, are eliminated.
These include acceptance for honor, and virtual and collateral ac-
ceptances. 75 Section 137 of the NIL76 is likewise eliminated. It pro-
vides for constructive acceptance by delay or refusal to return the
instrument or destruction thereof, and has caused endless con-
fusion. 7 The UCC treats the problem under Section 3-419, dealing
with conversion. I will refer to the matter again in discussing that
section.
Section 3411. Certification of a Check. Subsection (1) con-
tinues the distinction whereby the drawer and all prior indorsers
are discharged if the holder procures certification, whereas a certifi-
cation procured by the drawer leaves him liable. 8
Subsection (2), which is new, codifies the existing case law
73 Omo GEa. CODE Sec. 8229.
74 29 Orno Ju., Negotiable In.struments Secs. 325, 327.
75iNL Secs. 161-170, 134, 135; Omo GEN. CODE Secs. 8266-8275, 8239,
8240.76 Onio GEN. CODE Sec. 8242.
7 7 B1,rroN Sec 179.
78NIL Sec. 188; Omo GEN. CoDE Sec. 8293; Birrox Sec. 180.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
in providing that unless otherwise agreed, a bank has no obligation
to certify a check.79
Subsection (3), also new, recognizes the practice of certifying
a check before returning it for lack of proper indorsement. Such
action discharges the drawer.
Section 3-412. Acceptance Varying Draft. The qualified accep-
tance, a remnant of the horse and buggy era, is eliminated. If the
drawer's proffered acceptance varies the draft, the holder may re-
fuse it and treat the draft as dishonored. If, on the other hand, the
holder assents to the acceptance, each drawer and indorser who
does not affirmatively assent is discharged except where the vari-
ance is that payment shall be made only at a particular place. More-
over, the terms of the draft are not deemed to be varied by an
acceptance to pay at any bank in the United States.
Section 3-413. Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor. Sec-
tion 62 of the NIL80 has caused difficulty in the case of an instru-
ment altered and subsequently accepted. I will give an example in
order to illustrate the problem. Under Section 62 the acceptor
agrees to pay the instrument according to the tenor of his accep-
tance and he admits certain things such as the genuineness of the
drawer's signature. The correctness of the amount appearing on the
instrument is not listed among the admissions. Does that mean that
if the amount has been fraudulently raised, the acceptor is liable
only for the original amount? Or does his agreement to pay ac-
cording to the tenor of his acceptance make him in effect a guaran-
tor of the amount shown at the time of his acceptance? Or does
"tenor of acceptance" relate merely to the nature of the acceptance,
i.e., whether general or qualified?8 1 Solving the riddle the UCC
makes it clear that his engagement to pay relates to the tenor of
the instrument at the time of the engagement. The section applies
to all drafts, including checks.
Section 3-414. Contract of Indorsers: Order of Liability. Section
66 of the NIL82 embraces the indorser's liability as such and his
liability on the warranties of a transferor. The UCC separates
them, and the present section deals with the first-named liability.
It should be especially noted that the indorser engages to pay the
instrument according to its tenor at the time of his endorsement.
Thus, if the instrument has previously been altered, his engage-
ment is to pay it as altered.
Subsection (2), dealing with order of liability among indorsers,
79 E.g., Wachtel v. Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.. 326, 62 A.L.R 374
(1928).80 0mo GEN. CODE Sec. 8167.
81 See BEANNAx, NhGoTiAwlx INsTRu7mMs LAW 904, 917-919, 920-923
(7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
82Omo GEN. CODE Sec. 8171.
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makes no change and is intended merely to clarify existing law
under NIL Section 68.83
Section 3415. Contract of Accommodation Party. With regard
to accommodation parties the UCC is a big improvement over the
NIL. It combines three sections into one, clarifies the wording, and
adds new matter.
The section specifically recognizes that an. accommodation party
is a surety regardless of the capacity in which he signs. Moreover,
the words "without receiving value therefor," found in NIL Sec-
tion 29,84 have been eliminated. Those words have given rise to the
question whether a paid surety may be an accommodation party.
The UCC clearly answers the question in the affirmative.
Subsection (4) introduces a new and logical provision that an
indorsement which shows that it is not in the chain of title is
notice of its accommodation character.
Under the NIL courts have held that an accommodation party
who signs after the instrument is in the hands of a holder who has
given value, is not liable in the absence of some new consider-
.ation.8 5 Subsection (2) of the UCC section under discussion is de-
signed to change such a rule.
Subsection (5) makes it clear, contrary to some authority, al-
though not the majority,80 that an accommodation party who pays
the instrument has a right of recourse on the instrument against
the party accommodated.
Section 3-416. Contract of Guarantor. The NIL does not tell
us the effect of words of guaranty added to a signature. Conse-
quently, courts have had trouble in fitting such words into the law
of negotiable instruments.8 7 The UCC comes to the rescue by set-
ting forth the meaning of "Payment guaranteed" and "Collection
guaranteed," or equivalent words. When words of guaranty are
used, presentment, notice of dishonor, and protest are not neces-
sary to charge the user. No change is effected in Ohio law.
Section 3-417. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer. Under
NIL Sections 65 and 66,88 there is no warranty in favor of the
person paying or accepting the instrument. Instead, the warranties
are limited to transferees. Thus payors and acceptors are ordinarily
dependent upon quasi-contractual doctrines pertaining to money
paid or promised under mutual mistake of fact. The UCC extends
the warranty benefits to payors and acceptors.
Subsection (1) (c) settles a problem which is not clear under
83 OHio GEN. CoDE Sec. 8173.
84 OHIO GEN. CoDE Sec. 8134.
8 5 BRriTo Sec. 94.
86 BPrToN Sec. 297.
87 See Ban-ros Sec. 59.
88OHo GEN. CODE Sees. 8170, 8171.
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the NIL. The problem arises from the payment or acceptance of a
draft or check which has been materially altered. The UCC follows
the common law rule permitting the good faith payor to recover
and the good faith acceptor to avoid his acceptance. An exception
is made, as it should be, where the drawee bank accepts an already
altered draft which subsequently reaches a holder in due course.80
An exception is made also in the case of a holder in due course
of a note. In neither of these instances does the holder in due
course warrant against alteration.
Subsection (2) clarifies some difficult conflicts arising from
the rather vague language of NIL Sections 65 and 66. By Sub-
section (2) (d) it is made clear that the transferor, without indorse-
ment, warrants to his immediate transferee that no defense of any
party is good against him and that the general indorser warrants
the same thing to any subsequent good faith holder. However, this
warranty is not applicable to an indorser without recourse, who,
by Subsection (3), warrants merely that he has no knowledge of
such a defense.
By Subsection (2) (e), relating to the insolvency of the maker,
acceptor, or drawer of an unaccepted draft, it is made clear that
there is no warranty against insolvency as such. Rather, the trans-
feror warrants that he has no knowledge of the institution of any
insolvency proceeding.
Section 3-418. Finality of Payment or Acceptance. The famous
English case of Price v. Neal" held that a drawee who accepts or
pays a draft on which the drawer's signature is forged, is bound
on his acceptance and cannot recover back his payment. Section
62 of the NIL91 covers the acceptance situation but is silent with
reference to payment. Most courts have followed the common law
rule with reference to payment, some stating that NIL Section 62
was meant to include payment.92 The UCC makes it clear that such
a payment or acceptance is final in favor of a holder in due course.
In this latter respect the UCC goes further than some decisions
which, by way of modification of the rule, permit recovery by the
payor on the basis of mere negligence on the part of the holder in
taking the instrument.9 3 Under the UCC rule a holder in due course
would win, even though negligent.
The present section must be read in conjunction with Section
3-417, dealing with warranties.
Section 3-419. Conversion of Instrument; Innocent Represent-
89 See the discussion in connection with Section 3-413, supra.
903 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
91 Onio GEN. CODE Sec. 8167.
92 B.ElTIoN Sec. 135.
9 3 BmRTON Sec. 136.
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ative. Sections 136 and 137 of the NIL94 have caused a great deal
of difficulty and conflict. They deal with the retention and destruc-
tion of drafts presented for acceptance, and give rise to the so-
called constructive acceptance. Moreover, courts have extended
them so as to include checks presented for payment.95 As we have
already noted, UCC Section 3-410 has abolished this form of ac-
ceptance. The present section recognizes that refusal to return the
instrument on demand is a conversion, giving rise to an action in
tort rather than on the draft or check.
Another problem settled by this section arises from the follow-
ing typical facts. A person steals a check from the payee, forges
the payee's name as indorser, and gets the check cashed. The
drawee innocently pays the check. The payee, who is the true
owner, sues the drawee for the amount of the check. Most courts
hold that there is no recovery on the basis of acceptance, since
payment to the wrong party is not a promise to pay the owner.96
However, recovery against the drawee has been upheld on the
basis of conversion.9" Subsections (1) (c) and (2) recognize this
principle and designate the face amount of the instrument as the
measure of damages.
PART V.
PRESENTmENT, NOTICE OF DISHONOR, AND PROTEST.
Sections 3-501 through 3-511 relate to presentment, notice of
dishonor, and protest. Nearly one-third of the NIL is concerned
with these topics, whereas the UCC covers them in eleven sections.
The reduction is accomplished by elimination, simplification, and
reorganization. There is no point in laboring through the whole
business. In general, the requirements are similar to those of the
NIL. Consequently, it is enough to point out some of the more
significant changes and developments.
Section 3-501, stating when presentment, notice of dishonor,
and protest are necessary, contains two important changes. Under
Section 70 of the NIL,98 drawers of drafts other than checks are
wholly discharged by a failure to make due presentment, but draw-
ers of checks are, by that section, in conjunction with Section
186,11 discharged only to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Such a loss arises from the insolvency of the drawee bank, occur-
ring after the time when presentment was due. Subsection (1) (c)
94 Oio GEu. CODE Sees. 8241, 8242.
9 5 BnRrro Sec. 179.96 Brrm Sec. 146; Elyria Savings & Banking Co. v. Walker Bin Co.,
92 Ohio St. 406, 111 N.E. 147 (1915).
97 BmrroN Sec. 146.
98 Omo Gnu. CoDE Sec. 8175.
9 9 OHio GS CoDE Sec. 8291.
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changes the NIL by putting drawers of drafts in the same situation
as drawers of checks. That situation is described in Section
3-502 (1) (b), infra. The acceptor of a draft payable at a bank and
the maker of a note payable at a bank are placed in the same cate-
gory.
Another important change in the present section relates to
protest. Under Subsection (3) protest is necessary only in the case
of a draft which on its face appears to be drawn or payable out-
side of the states and territories of the United States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Under NIL Sections 129 and 152, combined,100
protest is required not only in the above situations, but even in the
case of a bill appearing on its face to have been drawn in one state
and payable in another. The inconvenience and expense of pro-
test justifies the change effected by the UCC.
Section 3-502. Unexcused Delay: Discharge. As indicated in
my remarks concerning the previous section, the present section
tells what happens in the case of an unexcused delay in present-
ment or notice of dishonor. There is no need to repeat which parties
are not wholly discharged. An example will point up the problem.
The holder of a check delays unduly in presenting it for payment.
The drawee bank fails. Under NIL Sections 70 and 186,101 the
drawer is discharged to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
But how may the loss be ascertained? The liquidation of the bank
is likely to take years, and until it is concluded, the extent of the
drawer's loss may be unknown. Without changing the principle of
the NIL, the present section of the UCC solves the difficulty in
a practical and fair manner. Subsection (1) (b) permits the drawer
to discharge his liability on the instrument by a written assign-
ment to the holder of the drawer's rights against the drawee bank
with respect to his funds in the bank, and provides that he is not
otherwise discharged.
Section 3-503. Time of Presentment. The most important vari-
ation in this section from the corresponding NIL provisions con-
cerns the question of reasonable time in the presentment of un-
certified checks for payment. We have seen that if a check is pre-
sented too late, the drawer is discharged under NIL Section 186102
to the extent of the loss caused by the delay, and that the UCC
Section 3-502 contains a comparable provision. But what is a rea-
sonable time? Lawyers and courts have struggled with the problem.
Subsection (2) of the present UCC section gives us a yardstick by
providing that with respect to the drawer, thirty days shall be
presumed to be a reasonable period within which to present for
1O0DOHio GEN. CODE Sees. 8234, 8257.
101 OHio Gsx. CODE Secs. 8175, 8291.
102 Omo GEN. CODE SeC. 8291.
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payment or initiate bank collection. In the case of an indorser, who
is wholly discharged by a delayed presentment, the presumption
is seven days after his indorsement.
In passing, it is of interest to note that many courts have adopt-
ed a one-day rule for presentment. 10 3 Such a short period is un-
realistic, and the UCC presumption is more sensible and just. Even
the courts which have the one-day rule often stretch it by excep-
tions. Some Ohio cases have employed the one-day rule, 0 4 but
there is no apparent policy preventing the UCC improvement.
Section 3-510. Evidence of Dishonor and Notice of Dishonor.
This is a new section, which, as the title indicates, specifies items
which are admissible as evidence and create a presumption of dis-
honor and notice of dishonor. There is nothing revolutionary about
the section. It merely aids in the proof of these matters by the
adoption of common sense rules of evidence and presumption.
PART VI.
DISCHARGE.
Sections 3-601 - 3-606, relating to discharge, create few im-
portant changes in the existing law. However, they reorganize the
subject matter in a manner more clear and concise than that em-
ployed in the NIL.
The concept of the discharge of the instrument is abandoned; 105
in its place is substituted the more accurate concept of the dis-
charge of parties.
Section 3-602 removes an uncertainty not settled in the NIL,
by providing: "No discharge of any party provided by this Article
is effective against a subsequent holder in due course unless he
has notice thereof when he takes the instrument." Thus, for ex-
ample, if the maker pays the instrument before due, and does not
obtain it from the person to whom he makes payment, the defense
is cut off when the instrument reaches a holder in due course.
Section 3-603 (1) is similar to NIL Section 88,106 but more se-
curely protects the rights of a person paying the instrument in the
face of a claim to the instrument by another person. The NIL sec-
tion protects the payor if he pays the holder in good faith and
without notice that his title is defective. The UCC gives the payor
more definite protection by authorizing the payment even though
he has knowledge of the third person's claim unless prior to the
payment the claimant either supplies adequate indemnity or en-
joins payment by court order. As stated in the Comment: "There
is no good reason to put him [the payor] to inconvenience because
103 BRANNAw, NEGOTiABLE INSTRUmENTs LAW 1296 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948).
104 E.g., Davis v. Benton, 2 Ohio Dec. Rep. 329 (Corn Pl. 1860).
10SNIL Sec. 119, OHIo Gm. CoDE Sec. 8224.
106 Owro GEN. CODE Sec. 8193.
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of a dispute between two other parties unless he is indemnified or
served with appropriate process." After all, his contract is to pay
the holder.
Section 3-604. Tender of Payment. There is one change in the
law in this section. Section 70 of the NIL 10 7 has been taken to mean
that makers and acceptors of notes and drafts payable at a bank are
not discharged to any extent by failure of a holder to make due
presentment at the bank. That is because, technically, they are
primary parties. 0 8 The UCC reverses the rule and, as in other
sections, places instruments payable at a bank in their proper set-
ting.
Section 3-606. Impairment of Recourse or of Collateral. This
section solves satisfactorily a problem not directly covered by the
NIL and giving rise to conflict in the decisions. Section 120 of the
NIL,10 9 relating to the discharge of persons secondarily liable, in-
cludes discharge by an agreement to extend the time of payment,
made without the assent of the secondary party. Unfortunately,
Section 119,110 concerning discharge of "the instrument," does not
contain a similar term. As a result, the following inequitable situa-
tion arises. Smith and Jones are co-makers of a negotiable promis-
sory note. Smith is the principal obligor, and Jones is a surety.
Without the assent or knowledge of Jones, Smith and the holder
agree to extend the time of payment. Since Jones is not a secondary
party, he does not have the benefit of Section 120 and therefore
remains liable.11 Yet by common law principles of suretyship, he
would be discharged. Section 3-606 remedies the defect by broad-
ening the discharge to cover any party. In addition, the section dis-
charges a party in case of the holder's unjustifiable impairment
of collateral given by the party or by a person against whom he
has a right of recourse. This fills another gap in the NIL. The Ohio
Supreme Court reached this palpably desirable result despite the
PART VII.
COLLECTION OF DocumFNTARY DRAFTS.
Sections 3-701 through 3-704, relating to the collection of docu-
mentary drafts, are almost entirely new but do not appear to be
controversial. They state in some detail the rights and duties of a
bank handling a documentary draft for a customer. A documentary
107 Omio GExS. CODE Sec. 8175.
108 Bp'r=oN Sec. 973.
1o90mo GEN. CODE See. 8225.
1100mo GEN . CODE Sec. 8224.
III Richards v. Market Exchange Bank, 81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N.E. 1000
(1910).
112 Goodman v. Goodman, 127 Ohio St. 223, 187 N.E. 777 (1933).
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draft is defined in Section 4-104 as "any draft with accompanying




Section 3-802 (3) stipulates that where a check or "similar pay-
ment instrument" provides that it is in full satisfaction of an obli-
gation, the payee discharges the underlying obligation by obtaining
payment of the instrument unless the original obligor has taken
unconscionable advantage. Contrary to the law in some states,"1
3
this provision permits an accord and satisfaction even where the
obligation is for an undisputed and liquidated debt. A number of
examples in the Comment illustrate situations in which the payee is
protected by reason of an unconscionable advantage taken by the
obligor. With this protection, the rule enunciated by the subsection
is a healthy advance in the law of accord and satisfaction.
Section 3-803 is new and is designed to prevent multiplicity
of suits. It provides that in an action on an instrument a defendant
may give written notice to any third person who is or may be liable
on the instrument, advising such person of his right to intervene
and that he will be concluded by any decision rendered. The person
notified may give similar notice to others. Any person so notified
may intervene, but even if he does not do so, he is concluded as
to any issue of fact therein determined.
Section 3-805 serves the excellent purpose of subjecting to
Article 3 instruments otherwise negotiable but not made payable
to order or bearer. The section includes the provision that there
can be no holder in due course of such an instrument. These non-
negotiable instruments have been stepchildren of the law, and the
decisions concerning them are in conflict. The present section re-
solves the conflict in a businesslike manner by giving them all the
advantages of commercial paper except those accruing to a holder
in due course.
CONCLUSION.
In this article I have considered a number of individual sections
of the proposed UCC and have endeavored to point out their re-
lationship to the NIL and their improvement over the NIL. As
stated at the outset, it has not been my purpose to discuss the
problems as fully as might be wished, for limitations of time and
space have necessitated comparatively abrupt treatment. Moreover,
the main function of this article is not to lead the reader into
lengthy arguments and explanations, but rather to cover a good
113 1 C. J. SEc., Accord and Satisfaction Secs. 31, 35 (1936).
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deal of ground, albeit in a cursory manner, in order that he may
understand what the UCC will do in a large number of specific
situations.
Disagreement in detail is bound to accompany consideration of
a proposed code of the scope of the UCC. But it should be remem-
bered that this Code is the product of years of labor by lawyers,
judges, and law teachers, who have gone through it with a fine-
tooth comb. Certainly so far as Article 3 is concerned, it is my
opinion that the Code is a vast improvement over the NIL and
should be adopted in Ohio.
